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The discrete time step pursuer-evader game was first
described by Rufus Isaacs of the Rand Corporation in the
early 1950's in an attempt to look at the problem of
attacking a moving target who is maneuvering so as to
confound the prediction of his future position. The general
problem, as described by Isaacs is as follows:
A battleship in midocean is aware of an enemy bomber's
presence, but the plane is too high for precise
detection. The ship is interested only in not being
hit; it has no offensive means. The plane has one bomb
and we suppose--to avoid extraneous factors--that the
bomber's aim is excellent. The battleship knows this,
but knows nothing about when or where the bomb will be
dropped until after detonation. It is to maneuver so
as to minimize the hit probability. . . There is a time
lag T between the bomber's last sighting of the ship and
detonation. Thus the bomber must aim at an anticipated
position of the ship . . . As simple as this problem
sounds circumstantially, it is difficult technically.
To gain a foothold, we simplified it further. We made
the ocean one-dimensional and discrete. That is, we
supposed the battleship to be located on one of a long
row of points and at each unit of time he hops to one
adjoining one, enjoying the sole choice of a right or
left jump. The time lag was to be an integral number n
of time units, or--the same thing--of jumps. This is
tantamount to saying that the bomber knows all positions
of the battleship which precede his present one by n
jumps or more Ref .CI]
.
The solution to the single time step game, (i.e. n=1 ) is
trivial but the complexity increases greatly as the time lag
or number of time steps increases. Isaacs, upon formulating
the game, proposed pursuer and evader strategies to the two-
step game, however the proof of the optimality of these

strategies is highly complex. The complexity of the multiple
step games arises from the fact that the evader doesn't know
when the pursuer will attack; if he did it would be an easy
matter for the evader to distribute himself uniformly over
the n+1 possible positions at the time of detonation, and
limit the pursuer to a kill probability of 1/(n+l).
Without knowing the time of attack the evader must attempt
to make his position uniform at every time step and this is
not possible.
The three-step pursuer-evader game is yet unsolved,
however near-optimal strategies for both the pursuer and
evader have been described. The best existing evader
strategy, developed by Joseph 3ram Ref.r2], involves the
evader maintaining an infinite memory of probabilities
corresponding to the probability of turning given the evader
has not turned for the last k moves. This thesis x^rill
investigate alternative finite evader strategies to attempt
to lower the existing upper bound on the three-step game
value while drastically reducing memory req_uirements and
additionally look briefly at possible evader strategies in
the four-step game.

II. KNOM SOLUTIONS AND STRATEGIES F.OR PURSUER-EVADER GAMES
A. STRUCTURE
For uniformity, the convention and structure described
below will be used hereafter in the description of all
discrete n-step pursuer-evader games. The pursuer is the
maximizing player who by selection of time of fire and aim
point tries to maximize the probability of killing the
evader (a kill is achieved when the pursuer fires at the
position the evader subsequently occupies n time steps
later). The evader is the minimizing player, who by selec-
tion of maneuvers along the discrete linear state space,
attempts to minimize the probability of being killed. The
evader's maneuvers can be described as a sequence of lefts
and rights (L and R) with each n-bit sequence of L's and
R's corresponding to one of the n+1 final positions
achievable in n steps from an arbitrary starting position as
shown in Figure 2.1. The above-described mapping of n-bit
left-right sequences to final position is symmetric under
interchange of L's and R's (i.e. LLR corresponds to a sym-
metric position to RRL in the three-step case). Due to this
symmetry it is ea^uivalent to describe the evader's maneuvers
as a sequence of straights and turns (S and T which provides
an equivalent mapping in Figure 2.2. A turn signifies the
evader moves in the opposite direction to his previous move

LLLL LLLR LLRR LRRL LRRR
LLRL LRLR RLRL RLRR
LRLL RLLR RRLL RRLR
RLLL RRRL
RRRR
Figure 2.1 Possible Evader Positions in n Steps.
TSSS TSST TSTS TTST TTSS
TSTT TTTT STTT STTS
TTTS STST SSTS SSTT
STSS SSST
ssss




and a straight signifies he continues in the same direction
as his previous move. Any n-bit sequence of lefts and rights
can be translated into an equivalent (n-1) bit sequence of
straights and turns (i.e. LRRL becomes TST). Note that in
general there may be several possible sequences of turns and
straights which lead to the same final position (for n=3.
TST, TTT, and STS all result in the evader occupying the
position one step to the left of his original position)
.
B. ONE- STEP GAME
The single step pursuer-evader game has a simple
solution. With only one time step elapsing between the
pursuer's time of fire and weapon detonation the evader can
always distribute himself uniformly over the two positions
achievable in one step shown in Figure 2.3. The evader on
each step can continue straight with probability (1-p) or
turn with probability p. Since the intelligent pursuer will
limit his shot to one of the two feasible positions of the
evader i-ihen he fires (position 1 or 2 of Figure 2.3). the
game can be represented graphically as shown in Figure 2./+.
The minimax solution occurs when p=0.5. The corresponding
value of the game is 0.5. The optimal evader strategy is to
fire at position 1 or 2 with equal probability.
C. TWO-STEP GAME
The two-step pursuer-evader game is not nearly as simple
in its solution as the one-step game 'he solution was
11





Figure 2.4- Graphical Solution to the One-Step Game
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found by starting with the hypothesis that the evader's
maneuver x-;ill depend only on his previous maneuver and none
earlier; thus the probability of continuing in the sane
direction as the last move is denoted by (l-p), with p being
"^he probability of moving in the opposite direction to the
previous move. The attainable positions for the evader and
the corresponding probabilities under the above hypothesis
are shown in Figure 2.5. The pursuer can be expected to
select the position ( 1 , 2 or 3) with the highest associated
probability. The evader will select p so as to minimize
this maximum probability. The optimal value of p is then
found by solving:
min [ MAX (p-pS p, (1-p)M]
s . t . 0£p<.1 .
Graphically the solution is shown in Figure 2.6. The
resulting solution is found by solving the quadratic p=(1-p)^
which has a root at p=(3-/5)/2 = 0.38197 . . . ; this value
is also the probability that the evader is in position 2 or
3 of Figure 2.5 and thus the value of the game. The proof
that this evader strategy is optimal and that (3-/5) /2 is
the value of the game is complex. Three different proofs are
given by Dubins Ref.[3] , Isaacs Ref.^/^] and Ferguson
Ref.r5j. The pursuer strategies in the multi-step games
are characterized by the non-existence of an optimal
strategy; the pursuer can always increase his expected
13
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Figure 2.6 Graphical Solution to the Two-Step Game.
U

kill probability by v;aiting a few more time periods but he
cannot wait indefinitely to fire or his payoff is zero.
This contradiction leads to strategies for the pursuer v;hich
have payoffs arbitrarily close to, but not equal to, the
value of the game, Ferguson developed such a pursuer
strategy which confirmed that (3-/5')/2 = 0.38197 . . . was
the value of the two-step game.
D. THREE- STEP GAME
As stated earlier the three-step pursuer-evader game is
yet unsolved. The value of the three-step game has been
bounded to:
0.28A23 < V < 0.28903
by Bram. This section will investigate previous near-
optimal evader strategies for the three-step game and the
resulting upper bounds uoon the game value.oil -L o
1 , Markov Rvnothesis Strategv
The Markov Hypothesis for the n-step pursuer-evader
game is stated as follows: the probability that the evader
will go left or right (or, straight or turn) is dependent on
the previous n-1 moves but not on any moves further in the
past than the n-lst. This form or evader strategy makes
intuitive sense since it does not seem likely that an
optimal evader strategy will depend upon information which
the pursuer already knows at the time of fire. The known
optimal strategies for the one and two-step games adhere to
15

the Markov Hypothesis. In the one-step game the optimal
evader turns or continues straight with equal probability,
therefore independent of all previous moves. (i.e. P(3) =
P(T) = P(L) = P(R)). In the two-step game the optimal
evader uses a strategy where the probability of turning (or
continuing straight) depends only upon his previous move
(i.e. P(3) = P(L|L) = P(R|R) = 0.61803 and P(T) = P(L|R) =
P(R|L) = 0.38197)
.
The Markov Hypothesis will now be applied to the
three-step game. Since the evader will condition his next
move upon his previous two moves, his strategy can be
described by a 2x2 transition matrix as shown in Figure 2.7.
The state of the evader a' any time is 3 or T since this
state is a function of the evader's last two moves (i.e. LL
or RR->3) . In this transition matrix:
g = P(Next state is S ! Last state was 3)
q = P(Next state is 3
I
Last state was T).
The four achievable positions for the evader in the three-
step game and the associated maneuver sequences are shown in
Figure 2.8. Let the variable W represent the final position
of the evader three steps after the time of fire; from
Figure 2.8 it can be seen We ( 1 , 2 , 3 »i4) . Let the variable
STATS represent the state (3 or T) that the evader occupies
at the time of fire. The probability that the evader














Figure 2.7 Markov Hypothesis Transition Matrix for
Three-Step Game.
Figure 2.8 Achievable Evader Positions in Three-Step Game
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conditioned upon his initial state. For example, given
STATE=S, to arrive at ¥=1, the sequence of transitions under-
gone must be:
S to T to S to S
The probability of this occurrence can be written:
P(VJ=1 |STATE = S) = (1-q^ )q2q-,






STATE = S) = (1-q^ ) q2 ( ^ -q-, ) + ( ^
-^i )(^-q2^^^^1 ^^"^1 ^^^2
sTATs=s) = (i-q^)(i-q2)q2+q-, ^
-q-, ) (
^
-q2 ) ^q-] ' ( ^ -q-] )
STATS = 5)=q^ ^
STATE = T) = (1-q2)q2q-,




= (1-q2)'q2 + q2(^-qi)(^-q2^^'^2^l^'^'^1^
P(W = ^|STATS =T)=q2q/
At any time the pursuer may choose to fire, he knows
which of the two states (S or T) that the evader is in by
observing his last two moves. The optimal values of q^ and
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with a corresponding game value of 0.294-23, the
resulting matrix of conditional probabilities is shown in
Table I. Ferguson states when presenting this evader
strategy, that it is not known to be optimal and in fact he
conjectures that no evader strategy of finite dependence is
optimal for the evader. The strategy of Eram presented in
the next section will show that indeed an evader strategy of
infinite dependence does result in a tighter bound on the
game value,
2. Infinite Dependence Strategy
As mentioned in Chapter I, the best existing evader
strategy for the three-step game was described by Joseph
Bram. This strategy can be described as an infinite sequence
of the conditional probabilities that the evader will con-
tinue straight given the state S of his previous moves. If
the previous move by the evader was a turn, the evader is in
state S=1 , while if the previous k-1 moves have been straight
the evader is in state S=k. (Note that the state space of S
is infinite). We will denote a turn by T and a straight by
S as before. At each time step the evader continues straight
or turns with a probability dependent upon his state S. Let:
p, = P(StraightlS=k)
.
If the evader is in state k at some time n, at time n+3 the




P(W=W! STATE) for Three-Step Markov Hypothesis Strategy
q^ = F(S|S) = 0.63397
q^ = P(S |T) = 0.73205
W= 1 2 3 ^
STATE
S .16987 .29^23 .28109 .25^80
T .12^35 .28719 .29^23 .29^23
20

previously. There are eight possible 3-bit sequences of S's
and T*s which correspond to the four possible terminal
positions as shown in Figure 2.8. The probabilities associa-
ted with each position \'J given k are as follows:
P(¥=llS=k)=(1-p^)p^P2
P(W=2|S=k) = (1-p,^)p^(1-P2) + (1-p^)(1-p^)' + PiJ1-p^^^)p^
P(W=3!S=k) = (1-p,^)(1-p^)p^+p^(1-p^^^)(l-p^)+p.^p^^^(1-p^^2)
P(W=4|S=k)=p^p^^^p^^2
If the evader fires at time n, at position \I , when S=k, his
expected payoff will be:
p(w=y!s=k)





The evader of course will attempt to select his infinite
array of P, ' s so as to minimize the above bound which is the
'^ k
maximum payoff that the pursuer can achieve. The best set
of Pv ' s found by Bram is delineated in Table II, while the
A
resulting P(W=W|S=k) is shown in Table III. The upper
bound on the game value under this specific set of Pi^ ' s is
the maximum value found in Table III or 0.28903. In this

































P(W=W|S=k) using p . 's of Table II
W= 1
13292 .28903 .28903 .28903
162^^6 .27682 .28903 .27170
U381 .27905 .28903 .28818
15090 .27591 .28903 .28417
U612 .2763^ .28903 .28852
U778 .27552 .28903 .28768
U658 .27560 .28903 .28880
U696 .27539 .28903 .28863
U666 .27539 .28903 .28892
U675 .27534 .28903 .28889
U667 .27534 .28903 .28896
U669 .27532 .28903 .28896
U667 .27532 .28903 .28898
22

dependence upon the previous moves. That dependence may
extend infinitely far back; thus the evader is required to
maintain the infinite array of Pi^'s to execute this near-
optimal strategy.
3 . Sub-Markov Strategy
The strategy presented here is due to Bouchoux
Ref.|_6j and is characterized by a strategy where the evader's
sequence of moves is not Markovian in itself but one in
which that sequence is generated by a substructure which is
Markovian, hence the description Sub-Markov. This form of
strategy is suggested by its use in providing optimal
strategies in emission-prediction games described by
Blackwell Ref.L?] and Matula Ref.CsJ. The pursuer-evader
game, while similar to emission-prediction games, is compli-
cated by the fact that there are several distinct sequences
of moves which lead to the possible terminal positions.
Since the pursuer (predictor) must fire at one of those ter-
minal points and not at a specific sequence of moves, the
game is more complex. Bouchoux describes a strategy based
upon three states. A, B and C, through which the evader
transitions in a Markovian manner. When in state A the
evader always turns, while in states B and C he always goes
straight. After each move, straight or turn, the evader
transitions between states according to a 3x3 transition
matrix and is ready for his next move. This strategy is
finite in the memory required by the evader and Bouchoux
23

obtained a bound on the game value of 0.28922 by optimizing
upon the transition matrix.
2^

III. EXTENDED MARKOV STRATEGY
A. MOTIVATION AND DESCRIPTION
The evader strategy to be investigated will be called
Extended Markov because it is an extension of the finite
dependence of the Markov Hypothesis strategy. The depen-
dence will be finite but will extend beyond the previous n-1
steps. In the Markov Hypothesis strategy, for the three-
step game, discussed in II.D.1., the best strategy for the
evader resulted in an upper bound on the game value of
0.294.23. If the dependence is restricted to only the pre-
vious move instead of the previous two moves the best
strategy results in an upper bound of 0.29630 (Note: this
is equivalent to adding the constraint q^ =q to the non-
linear problem described in II.D.1. with a solution at
q^=qp=2/3). Since Bram's strategy showed that the Markov
Hypothesis was not optimal for the three-step game, it seems
that a Markovian strategy where the dependence is finite but
extends beyond the last n-1 moves might result in a tighter
bound on the game value than previously obtained. This is
the class of strategies to be called Extended Markov. These
strategies for the three-step game, Markovian in nature,
will arise from a dependence upon the last three or more
moves and will be called the n-dependent strategies where n
represents the level of dependence. In this context, the
25

Markov Hypothesis strategy for the three-step game is the
two-deDendent strategy.
•to.
B. GENERAL N-DEPENDENT STRATEGY
In the n-dependent strategy the evader will determine
his next move based upon his previous n moves. The evader
can be thought of as controlling 2 variables, each being
the probability of going (say) right given the previous n
steps have been in a certain sequence. We will utilize the
left-right symmetry of the problem by considering only paths
where the last move is to the (say) right, resulting in only
2 ~ variables, each representing the probability of going
(say) straight given the last n steps have produced a
certain n-1 bit sequence of straights and turns. The general
n-dependent strategy can be described by a Markov chain
having 2 ~ states corresponding to the 2 different
n-1 bit sequences of straights and turns which are possible
based on the last n moves (i.e. conditioning upon the last
n moves is equivalent to conditioning on the last n-1
n-1
straights or turns). From each of the 2 ~ states there is
a fixed probability that the evader will maneuver to one of
the four final positions ¥ in the next three steps. A 2
~
n-1
x 2 transition matrix will be used to describe the condi-
tional probability of turning or continuing straight given
the current state ((n-l)-bit sequence). Since the state
describes the previous n moves in terms of straights and
turns only two possible transitions exist from each of the
26

states. The first n-2 bits of the state transitioned to are
determined by the last n-2 bits of the state transitioned
from; the last bit will be S or T depending upon the new
move. Due to this structure the transition matrix will be
completely defined by 2 ~ variables (called q. i=1 , 2 )
which represent the probability of continuing straight given
the current state. The other transition probability for
that state will obviously be (l-q.). Using a transition
matrix so constructed, the conditional probability of
ending in one of the four final positions (V/=1,2,3 or 4-) can
be found. In order to arrive in position 1, for example, the
sequence of states transitioned must result in the termina-
ting three-bit sequence, TSS, as can be seen from Figure 2.8.
Thus P(W=Wi STATE) is a function of the variables q. (i=1,










i = 1 ,2
IE)]
For general n, it is seen that the above program involves
minimizing the maximum of 2 (4. positions x 2^~ states)
non-linear functions of up to 2 ~ variables. No analytic
solution has been found and in later sections near-optimal




The first extension of the Markov Hypothesis strategy is
the three-dependent strategy described by four states (S3, ST,
TS, TT) and a 4.x4. transition matrix shown in Figure 3.1
where
:
q^ = P(next move is straight [ State is SS)
or equivalently
;
q^ = P(next state is SS | last state was SS)
The sixteen conditional probabilities of terminating in one
of the four positions W, given the evader starts from one of
the four states are listed in Table IV. The best solution
found using the three-dependent strategy gives an upper
bound on the game value of 0.28964- when:
q^ = 0.66163 q3 = 0.624.89
q^ = 0.7005A q, = 0.700$/;
The matrix of conditional probabilities evaluated at this
point are in Table V. This solution was found by utilizing
an improved feasible direction search which was started from
a known "good" solution. For the three-dependent strategy a
good starting point is found by applying the known two-
dependent (Markov Hypothesis) solution to the three-
dependent structure. If one applies the restriction q^ =q
and



















P(W=W| STATE) for 3-Dependent Strategy
Notation: p. = 1-q. i=1,2,3»^
(W=1 SS)
(W = 2 SS)
(W = 3 SS)
(w=^ SS)













= PTq2P3 ^ ^1^2^^ ^ ^lPl^2
=
PlPa'^^ "^ ^lPlP2 ^ ^I'^iPi
= P2^^^3
= P2^aP3 ^ P2P^P4 ^ ^2P3^2
= p^p^q^ + q2P3P2 + q2q3Pl
= q2q3qi
= P3q2^3
= p^q2P3 + P3P2P^ + ^3Pl^2
































































































































to the strategy discussed in II. D.I, with an upper bound
of 0.29423 when:
q^ = q = 0.63397 *^2 " ^4 " 0.73205
Analogously any near-optimal solution to the n-dependent
strategy will provide a "good" initial solution to the
(n+1 ) -dependent strategy. While the solution given above
for the three-dependent strategy is not known to be optimal,
but rather a local minimum of the problem described in
III.B., it does represent a significant improvement over the
two-dependent strategy (0. 29-^23) and is close in value to
the infinite strategy of Brara (0.28903). Appendix A pre-
sents an analysis of the above three-dependent solution and
shows that the proposed solution does satisfy first-order
Kuhn-Tucker conditions (necessary but not sufficient) for a
global minimum. It is interesting to note that in the
proposed solution q^"^/ °^*
P(S|ST) = P(S|TT).
Additionally in order for the pursuer to receive his maximum
achievable payoff he must refrain from attacking when the
state is TS or be limited to a payoff of 0.28191.
D. FOUR AND FIVE-DEPENDENT STRATEGIES
The treatment of the four-dependent and five-dependent
strategies is equivalent to the previously described three-
dependent strategy with the expansion of the state space and
32

number of variables involved to. eight .and sixteen
respectively. Good solutions to the four and five-dependent
strategies were found, as in the three-dependent case, by
starting at a known near-optimal set of values for the q. 's
and conducting an improving feasible direction search until
a local minimum was found. The best solutions thus found to
the four and five-dependent strategies and the resulting
conditional probability matricies are shown in Tables VI and
VII.
E. CHARACTERISTICS OF THREE, FOUR AND FIVE-DEPENDENT
STRATEGIES
The solutions found for the three, four and five-
dependent strategies, outlined in Tables V, VI and VII show
several revealing characteristics. In each case the condi-
tional probability of continuing straight given the n-1 bit
state is not dependent upon all of the information contained
in that n-1 bit sequence. The probabilities are dependent
only upon the number of time steps elapsed since the last
turn maneuver and not upon any turn-straight information
further in the past than that last turn. For example,
letting t denote the number of time steps since the last





























































































































































= P(Slt = 4.)
= P(Slt>/i)
It is hypothesized that this characteristic holds for the
optimal form of any n-dependent strategy. If this is so it
can be seen that the n-dependent strategy is a finite (trun-
cated) version of the Bram strategy presented in II. D. 2. and
as the level of dependence n is increased without bound the
bound of 0.28903 of Bram is expected to hold.
Each of the investigated strategies is also characterized
by having some states in which the evader must refrain from
firing, else he forfeits his ability to maximize his payoff.
As the level of dependence increases however, the penalty to
the pursuer who fires when the evader is in one of these
states diminishes. Table III* shows that under Bram '
s
strategy there is no time at which the pursuer cannot





The four-step pursuer-evader game has been the subject
of little interest due to the unsolved nature of the three-
step game. We shall briefly look at the four-step game and
discover that the apparent characteristic structure of the
three-step extended Markov strategies does not extend to the
four-step game. Given a four-step time delay between the
attacker's time of fire and subsequent detonation, the evader
may achieve five different positions through the sixteen
different four-bit sequences of turns and straights as shoxv/n
in Figure 4- • 1 . The Markov Hypothesis strategy solution to
the four-step game is due to Washburn Ref.l_9]. In the four-
step game the Markov Hypothesis has dependence extending to
the last three moves, the best strategy under this hypothesis
bounds the value of the game to 0.237^0 or below, the q
values and resulting conditional probability matrix is shown
in Table VIII. The first extended Markov strategy of the
four-step game, the only one investigated, is the four-
dependent strategy; in this strategy dependence reaches back
to the last four moves. The best solution found using the
four-dependent strategy is shown in Table IX and provides an
upper bound of 0.23734-. While this is an improvement over
the Markov Hypothesis solution of '.'ashburn, the improvement
is very slight. Additionally, no underlying characteristic
36

such as discussed in III.E. for the three-step extended
Markov strategies is apparent from the three and four-
depend'ent strategies inv-estigated for the four-step game.
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TSSS TSST TSTS TTST TTSS
TSTT TTTT STTT STTS
TTTS STST SSTS SSTT
STSS SSST
ssss
Figure lr.^ Achievable Evader Positions in Four-Step Game

TABLE VIII














1 2 3 k 5
SS .10330 .18677 .23739 .23678 .23575
ST .10329 .18511 .23709 .23710 .237^0
TS .10163 .18615 .237^0 .237^0 .237^0
TT .10331 .18512 .23709 .23710 .23738
TABLE IX
Three-Dependent Strategy to Four-Step Game
q. = 0.6972^ q = 0.69728
q' = 0.69727 q? = 0.69727
q^ = 0.70A66 q^ = 0.70^69
q^ = 0.6965A qg = 0.6972^
P(W=W|STATE)
TATE
1 2 3 k 5
SSS .10306 .18769
.2362A .23668 .2363^
SST .1029^ .18508 .23733 .23731 .23733
STS .10053 .18828 .2365^ .23733 .23732
STT .10329 .18518 .23731 .23712 .23709
TSS .10^57 .18826 .23622 .23612 .23^82
TST
.10294- .18508 .23733 .23731 .23733
TTS .10052 .18827 .2365^ .23733 .23733
TTT
.10306 .18509 .23731 .23721 .23733
39

V. CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS
The three-step pursuer-evader game remains unsolved.
The investigation of the extended Markovian strategies has
been shown to result in improved evader strategies over the
Markov Hypothesis but is not known to provide a better
strategy than the infinite memory strategy of Bram; in fact
it is hypothesized that the n-dependent extended Markov
strategy to the three-step game represents a finite approxi-
mation to the strategy of Bram. In this respect the results
are not entirely disappointing in that they provide a finite
strategy which appears to converge rather rapidly to a
strategy equivalent to Bram's infinite memory strategy. The
five-dependent strategy to the three-step game relies upon
five distinct variables:
^1 ^2 ^3 ^5 ^9
which provide an upper bound 0.28910 which is reasonably
close to the bound of 0.28903 provided by Bram's infinite
strategy. The near-optimal extended Markov strategies
presented in Tables V, VI, and VIII represent local minima to
the non-linear programming problem discussed in III.B.
While these can be seen to represent improvements from the
Markov Hypothesis strategy they may not be the globally
minimum strategies within the extended Markov structure. As
^0

the level of dependence in the extended Markov strategies
increases the mathematical complexity increases dispropor-
tionately; only the apparent characteristic of these ex"':ended
Markov strategies, discussed in III.E. makes them remotely
attractive
.
It still remains to be answered why the three-step game
is apparently non-Markovian in its optimal evader strategy
while "he one and two-step games are Markovian. The evader
strategy proposed by this thesis as well as the strategy
described by Bouchoux represent abstractions from the strict
Markov Hypothesis solution and although both strategies
represent a lowering of the pursuer's maximum payoff,
neither is as tight as the infinite strategy of Bram which is
strictly non-Markovian in nature. While improved finite
strategies may be possible by further abstraction from a
strictly Markovian strategy, it has been conjectured that no
finite strategy is optimal for the evader. This is known to
be true for the pursuer since he must observe the evader for
an ever-increasing length of time if he wishes to achieve
optimality (with the exception of the one-step game where
both sides have finite optimal strategies). Bouchoux
suggests that a generalization of his sub-Markov strategy,
involving three distinct Markov states each with some fixed
probability of generating a straight or a turn, might provide
a tighter bound on the game value due to its further
abstraction from a Markov behavior. However, the mathematical
A1

complexity of locating optimal or near-optimal strategies
within this framework is considerable.
The four-step game appears even more difficult. The
Markov Hypothesis solution is shown to be a sub-optimal
strategy, being dominated by the three-dependent extended
Markov strategy of Table IX. The strategies found to the
four-step game in Tables VIII and IX appear to preclude an
extension of Bram's infinite strategy to the four-step game.
The apparent dissimilarity between the known near-optimal
evader strategies from the two to three to four-step games is
perplexing.
The discrete evasion game upon a two or three dimensional
surface is another area which holds promise for future
research. The work of Ferguson solves the two-step game for
a special class of graphs he calls restricted n-graphs;
however the two-step game upon more general two-dimensional
surfaces, as well as the three-step game, are unsolved.
The discrete pursuer-evader game, as described by Isaacs
in 1954.. was generated as a simplification of a much more
complex problem. The continuing mystery surrounding all but
the simplest of these "simplified" games provides a wealth




INVESTIGATION OF THE THREE-STEP EXTENDED MARKOV STRATEGY
In III.B., the general n-dependent extended Markov
strategy was presented. The best solution found for the
case n=3 is given in Table V. As stated earlier, this solu-
tion is not known to be optimal but can be shown to satisfy
the first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions (necessary but not
sufficient) for a global minimum.







There are sixteen separate functions (see Table IV), from
which the maximum will be selected by the pursuer's choice
A
of W and STATE (i.e. by his selection of aim point and time
of fire), the evader must select the q.'s so as to minimize
this maximum payoff. Let f
.
, f^, . . . , f./ represent the
sixteen functions described in Table IV, then the problem
becomes
:
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Introducing a dummy variable q^* the above non-linear
program may be equivalently written:
mm q^
s.t. f. - qc < 0-0 J=1-16
q. - 1 .0 < 0.0 1 = 1-4.
q. > 0.0 1=1-4
The structure of this problem allows some additional
conditions to be placed upon the optimal solution;
0.0 < q. < 1 .0 i=1 ,2,3,^.
Close inspection of the functions, f., show that if:
«J
q. = 0.0 or
p. = 1 .0-q. =0.0
then at least one of the f.'s will have a value of 0.0. If
any f.=0.0 then the remaining three f.'s associated with the
same initial state must sum to 1.0, since for any initial
state
:
P(W=1 ,2,3 or ^ISTATE) = 1 .0
The minimum of the maximum of three non-negative numbers
which sum to 1.0 must be at least 1/3, which is greater than
the known upper bound on the value of the game. Therefore:
0.0 < q. < 1 .0 i = 1-ii
klr

Based upon the above characteristic of the problem the
constraints
;
q. - 1 .0 < 0.0 i = 1-^
will not be binding at the optimal solution and may be
dropped without consequence, resulting in:
mm 5
s.t. f. -q. <0.0 J=1-16
q. > 0.0 i=1-5
The first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the above problem















L(q,A) = q^ - ZA.(f. - q^)






q. 1^ = 0.0
q. > 0.0
i = 1-5
In the proposed near-optimal solution in Table V, seven
of the sixteen inequality constraints are binding; that is:
^4 = ^6 = ^7 = ^8 = fu = ^15 = ^16 = ^5 = °-2896i
the remaining nine constraints are slack, it follows that:









= 0.0 i = 1,5 A. < 0.0
J
-
j = 4, 6, 7, 8, U, 15, 16
with the substitution of the values.
q^ = 0.66163 q2 = 0.70054 qo = 0.62^89 q, = 0.70054
3L
the five constraints (-r— = 0.0), become a set of fiveda.^1
linear equations in seven unknowns (A,, A,, A„, Ao» A.,, A. ^
,
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will satisfy the modified Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Using
linear programing methods, such a set of X's was found,
thereby verifying the satisfaction of the Kuhn-Tucker condi'
tions at the proposed three-dependent strategy of Table V.
The near-optimal solutions to the four and five-dependent
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